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Dawne McCance
Julia Kristeva et une 6thique de I'exile
Un texte de Kristeaa, 'My Memory's Hyperbole' (Ma mdmoire hyper-
bole) sert de modile pour les textes autobiographiques des t'emmes qui
s' dcartent du norme de 'raconter un aie' pour 'grapher I' auto.' L' auto'
biographie de Kristeaa se prdsente au pluriel pour prendre ses distances
d'un sujet refdrentiel, il se prdsente plutdt comme un sujet en procbs
dont la drame de se faire aiaant en diff 6rd se trace dans toutes ses muta-
tions et ses diaisions. McCance dlabore la thdorie Kristeaan du sujet en
procDs dans le contexte des mdditations sur une dthique de Ia transt'or-
mation d fin de remplacer une dthique humaniste, perspectiae fonder
sur un sujet stable. Etant donndle r6le important que Kristeaa attribue
h la littdrature dans cette 4thique de la transt'ormation, McCance dla-
bore sa thdorie par Ie biais de l'oeuare de deux poites canadiennes,
Smaro Knmboureli et LoIa LemireTosteain.
person (O.E.D.): (a mask used by aplayer, a character or personage
acted (dramatis persona), one who plays or performs any part; in the
general philosophical sense: a self-conscious or rational being
The mirror no longer exists in
which a monolithic logos 
- 
a
'monologic' 
- 
once appeared
.. . this passing beyond repre-
sentation, this zuork which
destroys it,has always been
the'other' of theological dis-
course, has always consti-
tuted theatrical space, in
which the'I' puts on the mask
of equiaocal laughter of sex-
Here I use 'person' to identify those
entities that are self-conscious, ratio-
nal and self-determining. Such a use
of 'person' is important, for it will
help to determine which entities exist
that can act as we, that can know they
exist and act, and which can, then,
reflect upon their knowledge and
action and take responsibility for it.
This use of person arises in discus-
sions of the existence of other minds
ZJ
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ual excesses in order to mime and can be construed as an epistemo-
the drama of his analysis, that logical use of the term. The explora-
is, of his death. From the tion of such epistemological issues
GreekMenippean satire on to (e.g. on what grounds can I know that
Lucan and Petronius, to the an entity is a person?) requires ren-
mediepal carniaal 
- 
a theatre dering the definition of person as a
with no stage and therefore concept as precisely as possible. Such
with no audience and no per- precision will be an ontological quest
formance, for eaeryone to be clear about a category of real-
inaoloed ishis own author ity.... One should note that interest in
and actor,his ego andhis defining the concept of person is not
alter ego 
-to Rabelais and just ontological or epistemological.
Swift, to Joyce, Artaud and One is not simply concerned with
Bataille, the deathly laughter categorizing the entities that furniture
of this deconsecrated'I' the world. One is interested as well in
becomes stronger and clearer, the concept of person due to its role in
morebiting and ffictiue.It ethical theory. Thus, in addition, one
destroys the monoilogic of rep- will be interested in identifying those
resentational literary dis- entities that are self-conscious, ratio-
course and sets the general nal, and self-determining, because
scene for a kaleidoscopic and they will, as well, be the moral agents
pluralist way of writing in of the universe.2
which we see nothing, for it is
the writing which sees us.l
In 1984, Julia Kristeva wrote the essay, 'My Memory's Hyperbole,,
for inclusion in an anthology of female autobiographies edited by
Domna Stanton and titled TheFemale Autograph.3 Stanton explains in
her Preface that she excised bio from autobiographv in the volume,s
title in order to bracket the traditional emphasis on autobiography as
the recounting of 'a life,' with that notion's facile presumption of
referentiality, and to suggest that the women's writing in this collec-
tion does not so much narrate as 'graph the aufo.' 4 Kristeva,s essay is in
keeping with this non-referential understanding of the setf, since it is
offered ashyperbole., not to be taken literally, and since it is written in
the first person plural, a form which she adopts in place of the objec-
tive and authorial 'I'. 'My Memory's Hyperbole' traces through the
evolution of the so-called Tel Quel group in Paris, from the time of
Kristeva's arrival late in 1955, until 1974, when the Tel euel jownal
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folded. The essay does provide a scheme, then, an outline of intellec-
tual and political developments, but written as the auto(bio)graphy of
a 'we' that remains hyperbolic. As Domna Stanton describes it,
Kristeva's essay 'confounds generic and genderic boundaries' as it
discusses intellectual and political movements in Paris, 'analyzing
the various scenes, acts, and dramatis personae not merelyas a critical
observer, but undeniably as a major protagonist.'s Against the back-
ground of political and intellectual revolution, Kristeva's memoir is
written as a history which analyses its self , that selfs ongoing muta-
tions and divisions. The result is not the narration of a stable and uni-
fied subject, but the drama of a hyperbolic subject-in-the-making,6 a
subject which 'is alive only if it is never the same.'7
In the following paper, I attempt to outline Kristeva's theory of this
subject-in-process in the context of her reflections on ethics. Although
little critical attention has been given to the point, the status of the
subject in relation to ethics is an important issue in all of her writing.
She argues repeatedlyagainst the definition of ethics as a prescriptive
moralism which legitimizes the static humanist subject, and in favour
of one which views the transformation of this subject as the contem-
porary ethical imperative. Kristeva maintains that literature plays an
important role in this ethical transformation, a point which I will
explore in relation to two Canadian women writers, Lola Lemire Tos-
tevin and Smaro Kamboureli. In the conclusion of the paper, I com-
ment on Kristeva's analysis of the women's movement in regard to
her suggested reformulation of ethics.
1. s'exiler: to go into exile; to expatriate one self
L'exil coupe les liens, et jusqu'aux plus profonds, ceux du Sens, ceux
qui nous at t ach ent d I a cr oy anc e que g a 
- 
I a ai e 
- 
a Un S ens, gar ant i p ar
un pire mort.8
In her Preface to Desire In l-anguage, Kristeva writes of 'the neces-
sity of adopting a stance involving otherness, distance, even limita-
tion' as 'the only guarantee of ethics' in a world of technological
rationality.e Such a stance requires that a subject recognizes itself as
double, as made up of an other-self, and as subject of a discourse
which arises from another discourse.l0 It is, therefore, not the theoret-
ical stance of a monological subject: a subject who sees its self as one, a
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conscious unity, and as such, as master of its own discourse. Kristeva
refers to monological theory as a 'zero-one' system, that is, a system in
which a univocal subject conceives of language as a unidimensional
structure which s/he uses to define all terms as either true or false,
either same or different.ll Because monological discourse sets up this
either / or larn of the excluded middle, it functions as prohibition or clo-
sure.12 The monological subject hems us in (sutur) to a predeter-
mined meaning and coherence, disallowing what is heterogenous to
his / her system, closing off what is other in language.
Kristeva refers to this monological prohibition as a 'moral code'
precisely because it has long governed western morality.13 Particu-
larly since the seventeenth cenhrry, and the emergence of the modern
subject as both the Cartesian cogito and the subject of individual
rights, western moralily has been based on the idea that conscious
unity gives the moral subject control or mastery, and thereby makes
him free.la According to John Locke, for example, the term person
applies only to a conscious self, whose rights (freedoms) are
grounded in his conscious rationality.15 Not the least of these rights,
for Locke, is the right to private property, which includes proprie tary
ownership and control of one's body.15 There is no departure from
this logic in contemporary moral philosophy's definition of theperson
as 'an entity that has the (actual, not merely potential) capacity for
consciousness, complex and sophisticated perception, rationality,
self-awareness, and self-motivated behaviour', with the attendant
assertion that only such persons are possessors of full moral rights.iT
In contemporary moral philosophy, rights are understood as claims,
such that 'To have a right to something is to be in a position, morally
or legally, to demand that thing as properly one's own.'18 And the pre-
eminent moral right, of course, is property, understood as privacy,
autonomy or self-determination, and as granting ownership and con-
trol of one's body. According to philosopher ]udith ]arvis Thomson,
this right to privacy applies particularly to contemporary women,
who are now demanding their full rights to choice and control:
nVomen have said again and again, 'This body is mybodyl and they
have reason to feel angry, reason to feel that it has been like shouting
into the wind... if a humanbeinghasany just, priorclaim to anything
at all, he has a just, prior claim to his own body.'1s
Kristeva writes that anyone who ascribes to this monological the-
ory ought 'to pause and query the ethics of his own discourse.'20 That
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the comment appears in an essay on 'The Ethics of Linguistics,' indi-
cates that, for her, the subject of ethics is not confined to a specialized
discipline of philosophy or theology. All discourse has an ethical
function, and all monological discourse functions coercively, to rein-
force an unethical moral code.21 Kristeva's analysis parallels that of
other TeI Quel writers during the 1960's, notably Jacques Derrida and
Michel Foucault, insofar as it locates the contemporary problem of
power in the subject's constitution of itself as a conscious and private
unity.22 According to these writers, the constitution of the subject in
this form is the principal support of modern capitalist-technological
society, where the most profound form of techne is not external con-
trols or instruments, but a subject-based discursive rationality. Cru-
cial to this kind of power is a disciplinary fixation on the proprietary
body, which becomes as much an object for the modern subject, as
does nature, language, and all that is not-same, not-conscious, not-
person.23 For Kristeva, what is particularly dangerous, and unethical,
about this subject is that it masks its violent separations and divisions.
For the modern monological subject, coercion functions under the
cover of unity, equality, freedom, and 'natural' language.2a
Kristeva's early essays, many of which are publishedin Sdmdiotikd
("1969), attempt to move literary criticism and stucturalist linguistics
from monological theory to what she calls the 'zero-two' practice of
poetic language.2s For example, 'Pour une s6miologie des
paragrammes' uses Ferdinand de Saussure's Anagrammes to develop
the notion of a paragrammatical text: the text as an interrelation of
texts; a multi-faceted juncture of meanings and codes.25 The goal is to
'dynamize' structure through a theory of the text as production and of
language 'as a free play, forever without closure.'27 A semiotics based
on this model would emphasize 'the dynamics of production over the
actual product' and therefor e the otherness (alteritd) of what it studies,
rather than focusing on a reified and representable object.28 At the
same time, since the text is inseparable from subjectivity, shifting
toward the other scene of the text's production implies a similar dis-
placement and'spatialization' of the writing subject, and suggests the
need for a theory of this subject as itself a productive activity in lan-
guage. In the field of poetic language, Kristeva explains,'the unit'one'
(definition, 'truth') does not exis(: every poetic paragram is a double
and the notion of a 'person-subject of writing' gives way to that of a
self which is both 'I' and an other.2e
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In this poetic 'doubling' of the subject and language, Kristeva iden-
tifies what she calls the 'ethical dimension' of Roman Jakobson's
work.3o Jakobson's reading of the futurist poets is an 'opening' of
monological theory to the'other of the linguistic and ,/ or social con-
tracfl, thereby enabling the speaking subject 'to shift the limits of its
enclosure.' By giving voice to the rhythm inscribed in Mayakovsky's
poetry/ Jakobson allows us to hear the 'silent causality and ethics'
inherent in poetic language. The essential point for Kristeva is that
language is double: both rhythm and structure, both struggle and law;
and that the subject is never either monological reason or asymbolic
rhythm, but a subject who both formulates meaning and questions
those formulations in an unending dialogical process.3l In her essays
on Mikhail Bakhtin, Kristeva again links this dialogical theory to the
development of what she calls an 'ambivalent ethics,' where the pri-
vate author-owner gives way to an older understanding of the person
as dr amat is p er sona, a player whose drama-s truggle is in langu age.32
A Bakhtinian ethics is 'ambivalent' because it is simultaneously
one and the other, never individual, and never closed off from the
body.33 In that it opens to the depth of the subject, it is, for Kristeva,
'quasipsychological,' 3a and a foreshadowing of what I am calling her
psychoanalytic 'ethics of exile.' Kristeva's psychoanalytic theory
emphasizes that for every subject in language there is a hef erogeneous-
ness to meaning and signification. For her to refer to signification as
significance, then, is not simply a way of introducing dynamism (pro-
cess) into the traditional notion of representation.3s The goal is to
open representation to a pre- or translinguistic modality of psychic
inscription which she calls the 'semiotic' (Ie sdmiotique), from the
Greek sdmeion, mark, trace of the unconscious other. The'semiotic' is
distinct from, and supplementary to, the 'symbolic' (le symbolique),
language as representation, meaning, sign.35 Although the two
modalities can be recombined in differentways to constitute different
types of discourse, language as social practice necessarily presup-
poses both the 'semiotic' and the 'symbolic'. I think the point is cru-
cial. There is, for Kristeva, no possibility of a monological subject who
could completely close off the unconscious to secure unity and cer-
tainty in language, and neither is there any possibility of a meaningful
language outside the pro-positioning of a conscious subjectivity. For
her, the subject in language exists in a permanent state of division
between the semiotic and symbolic, a division which univocal ratio-
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nal discourse attempts to hide. While it is the case, for her, that there
must be separation (of subject from object) and division (of conscious
from unconscious) in order for a subject to posit meaning in language,
the subject in language must nevertheless remain in a hyperbolicsujet
enprocis: a subject-in-process / on trial. This subject becomes itself as
an unfinished production in language. It is thus a divided subject,
placed on trial by its own otherness, a subject which posits its thesis as
undecidable process between semiotic and symbolic.3T
InReaolution in Poetic l^anguage,Kristeva argues that the reformula-
tion of ethics today cannot be undertaken apart from a perspective
which recognizes this process / trial of the subject in language.38 That
is, unless it is to be an extension of monological morality, ethics can-
not be stated as scientific truth about the nature of the persory sexual-
ity, the Good. For Kristeva, this kind of moralism suppresses the ethi-
cal function, in complicity with a necessarily oppressive System.3e In
her words: 'The ethical cannot be stated, instead it is practiced to the
point of loss, and the text is one of the most accomplished examples of
such a practice'. a0 But 'the text fulfills its ethical function only when it
pluralizes, pulverizes, 'musicates" meaning; that is, only when it
opens to anotherness which puts monological meaning ontrial('reach-
ing out to the other, the ethical'at). The subject of such an ethics cannot
elevate him / herself to the philosopher's position of privilege (privi-
lege: priaus: private + lex: law).In Kristeva's understanding, there is
no fixed position for a subject above or outside of language. The sub-
ject's only place is in language, and therefore, its position (identity,
meaning) can never be fixed. Kristeva's subject is one who wanders:
'an outcast, a lost soul (dgard),'42 a subject for whom the question of
identity is not one of being,butof pla ce:'Whereaml?'rather than'Whl
am I?' For the space with which the outcast, the excluded is preoccu-
pied, is never one;it is neither homogenous nor totalisable, but essen-
tially divisible, pliable, catastrophic.' a3
2.'An Exile who asks,'Where?' 44
The 'where?' of a self's identity is the recurring question of Smaro
Kamboureli's in the second person ('It hurts not to know where home
is.'; 'i ask her where my polis is.'; 'you seem not to know where you
are.').as In this female autographic text, the writer traces the history of
her self as she emigrates from Greece through the United Statei to
Canada. Thebook does not conform to themonological definitionof a
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unified genre, since it is a 'permutation of texts,'46 or what Helen Buss
describes as a 'm6lange of forms 
- 
poetry, anecdotes, quotations, aph-
orisms, discussions, jokes, dreams, memories, diary entries and nar-
rative transitions'.a7 As John Donlan suggests, this plurality of forms
and styles 'enacts' an understanding of the self as 'fragmented, multi-
ple and elusive' and it suits the book's theme of the search for self
through the production and examination of texts, 'those writings ...
we generate ... which are us and not-us.'48 In this auto(bio)graphy,
exile is not simply a condition of dislocation from place and language,
but of the dislocating place of language ('Not place and language. But
place of language.'(t1)), the self's splitting and shifting in language,
such that 'Nobody can / ask where / exactly / it lies'(60).
On the opening page of the book, Kamboureli tells us that before
she left Greece, she burned her previous writing 
- 
a diary, the begin-
nings of an aborted novel, pages of prose poems 
- 
an act which
'seemed to be a way of erasing personal traces, traces of language,
whose absence could set me free and open to receive what is on the
other side of the ocean.'(7) The ritual burning was, she says, 'a gesture
that defined me through langtage.'(7) For this self who is defined
through language,'(i)mmigration is a form of abjection'(8), such that
movement into a second language is experienced as erasure of her for-
mer self: 'To live bathed in a language other than my mother tongue, I
have to partially drown the being that was nourished by the mother
tongue.'(10) In this sense, in the secondpersonis ameditation on exile as
division of self, and displacement of a former self, who becomes the
writer's other-self, the other whom she addresses, and by whom she is
addressed in this dialogical discourse ('writing as trace of a dialogue
with oneself (with another)'ae):
are we getting even
now is that what it is you have a greek
accent and i have an english accent so
we're told(35)
you can't spit me out
Iam the image
of your life locked
between the folded
wings of a butterfly (52)
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As the book develops, the authorial'I'undergoes further fragmen-
tation, becoming more polyphonic and elusive, more of a stranger to
monological language. Something can be said 'in person' here with-
out issuing from the authorial form of the first person, but from the
second and third persons, indeed from the various forms (genders,
genres) that a multiple 'I' can occupy, and that we hear in a plurality of
voices ('i. me. you. the other.'(79):
i play
you play
s/he plays
it plays
we play
you play
they play
It is this plurivocalit/, this otherness, which causes a trial of the
subject in language. Without strictly wanting to recognize her other
(nVhy am I looking for samenes s?'(4t); 'it is siesta time. keep silent. lie
down. dream, if you wish.'(35);'you haven't visited me today / but
i'm not lonely / i think of my contentment as my revenge.'(53), Kam-
boureli never ignores this other for a minute, never settles down as a
unified subject;
but you are not a memory. you
are the act of remembering itself. you are the other ... you
know no temporal boundaries... no spatial borders....
only a huge act of will can put a stop to your spiralling
presence around me. I have, again, to find my way through
the passages you open for me. i'm after you, too; but not
with your own persistence. i was there then, yes. but i'm
here now. mark these words. (+3)
This borderline condition 'on the edge of two languages, on the
edge of two selves named and constructed by language' (rr) is both
unsettling ('when i get closer to you i tremble with confusion. / i,m
not sure whether i want to know where you live / so that i can run
away from you, or whether i want / to meet you, to blend withyour
historic present.'(52), and liberating, a release from monologism into
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jouissance: 'The self becomes a being of multiple meanings andiouis-
sance andmany little deaths.'(tt). Near the end of the book is a journal
entry which recalls a serial dream, and which perhaps sums up this
self's process / trial in language:
In a maze all night. Ek-static, lost in the surprise of motion,
constant movement toward a polis. When I reached it, it
was all in ruins.(76)
Lola Lemire Tostevin, in Color of Her Speech asks 'where / and with
what words / do we begin?'so Like Kamboureli, Tostevin writes of
the self-alienation which results from the 'un-speaking' of hermother
tongue, in this case French, by the dominant English language. In Tos-
tevin's poetry, this 'alien condition' stems not only from the displace-
ment of her French mother tongue, but from the excision of woman's
tongue by a male monological system. In the either/or (male/not-
male, person/not-person) terms of this monological system, woman
is either silenced-excluded as 'a phenomenon of some outside
world,'51
once
the mouth
stood empty
it was easy
to introduce
your difference
or, she is allowed to come into the system, but at the price of effacing
sexual difference, 'since the Cartesian cogito is related to a subject
which bears no sexual identity and since its clarity of mind barely
acknowledges the existence of a body or an unconscious working
from an affective and sensory system.'s2 In entering the monological
system as a unified person-subject of language, woman
becomes one
half
Tostevin neither identifies with the unitary subject nor suggests
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that women can withdraw into an asymbolic femininity. For her, a
female self-identity can only be produced in process in language.
Color of Her Speech:'it takes / a different tongue / to penetrate / a dif-
ferent depth.' Tostevin's writer-self wanders from one side to 'the
other' of patriarchal language tracing a path of jouissance:
mother
tongue
memory
drawing
towards with-
drawing
retracing
retrieving
dla source
d la ddriae
adrift
driving along the shore
of the St Lawrence
on a sunnyMarch morning
babbling french with Jean Marcel
after all these years
river
frozen
fixed
fleuae
flows back
to oague
memory53
One of the ways in which Tostevin's poetry opens to a new depth,
and thereby to new possibilities, is throughherexplorationof rhythm.
In her poetrp to use Kristeva's words, 'the sounds of language are
more than phonemes.'sa They inscribe an unconscious dimension
which is unacknowledged by univocal language. In ,Gyno-Text,
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(Color of Her Speech) for example, Tostevin uses rhythm to reconnect
language with the female body which has been muted and repressed
by the monological system, and in the process, she resignifies female
sexuality as multiple, fluid, and relational:5s
oral
Pit
spits
yolk
spins
spine
first
embryo
rolls
like
a
scroll
breath
of
bone
by
bone
body's
pounding
articulation
arteriole
first
vowel
heart
some
volce
boxed
in
ears
echo
deeper
tympa
tym
panic
rhythm
ofa
w)here
Tostevin's writing here may relate intertextually to Kristeva's 'Sta-
bat Mater,' that typographically fragmented essay in which the main
text is accompanied by rhythmic, poetic inserts which use alliterative
patterns and semantic dislocations in an effort to join the written
word to its underlying body.s5 Certainly, both 'stabat Mate/ and
'Gyno-Text' situate the writing subject on what Kristeva calls ,the
place of the scar' or 'wound,' the place which Tostevin refers to in
Color of Her Speech as the 'cicatrice': the borderlinebetween conscious
and unconscious. sT Here, truth no longer has reference to a subject, or
object, identifiable outside of language, but to a poetic practice which
opens monological meaning and allows for the possibility of renewal.
3. 'Where can be our place in the symbolic contract?, 58
Kristeva argues that a dialogical subject-in-process cannot take (a)
place inside the social contract, that its 'only inhabitable place 
- 
locus
- 
is language.'se This is the crux of her criticism of the kind of femi-
nism which represents a 'logic of identification, with the patriarchal
system, its conscious subject and his proprietary rights.5O While
lulia Kristeaa and the Ethics of Exile . 35
acknowledging the accomplishments that this kind of feminism has
achieved, she considers it nonetheless a strategy which conforms to
the seventeenth century idealof homo rationalis, and therefore,which
cannot succeed in providing for fundamental and long-term change.
Her writing always begins from the same basic premise: '... there can
be no socio-political transformation without a transformation of sub-
jects.'61 On the other hand, to say that women must break with the
subject of the social contract does not mean, for Kristeva, that they are
exiled to a foreign land outside patriarchal society, 'an a-topia, a place
outside the law.'62 She argues that the kind of utopian feminism
which dreams of a countersociety founded on the qualitative differ-
ence of women from men, and 'imagined as harmonious, without
prohibitions, free and fulfilling,' constihrtes an inverted sexism which
only reiterates the monological rule of ONE.53
Etymologically, Kristeva points out, analysis means dissolution: to
unbind, dissolve, cut, divide, dislocate, lose.5a She emphasizes that
psychoanalysis does not liberate us into self-completion and whole-
ness. Its task, instead, is to record thecrisls of unifyinginterpretations.
Focusing her critique on the unitary subject, Kristeva takes the analy-
sis of contemporary technological power 'into the very interior of
every identity,' and to the'cuttingedge' (wound, cicatrice) of the nec-
essary divisions between 'self and 'other' which characterizes the
construction of an identity in language. The analysis is undertaken in
order to bring out 'along with the singularity of each person, and, even
more, along with the multiplicity of every person's possible identifi-
cations,' the'relatiztity' of his or her identity / meaning in language.6
For Kristeva, this is the ethical meaning of psychoanalysis, and the
significance it might have for a fledgling feminist ethics. For her, any
person aware of the fact that his or her order is divisive, and poten-
tially violent, will emphasize 'the responsibility which all ... face of
putting ... fluidity into play against the threats of death which are
unavoidable whenever an inside and an outside, a self and an other,
one group and another, are constituted.'56 The goal is to develop
kinds of thinking, writing and teaching, which leave openings for the
other. In undecidability lie the psychoanalyst's desire and ethics.57
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